Countering Terrorism - Aviation Passenger Profiling

Chapter I

EXPLOSIVES' THREAT TO AVIATION
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(See figure in printed
edition.)

Unclassified reporting indicates changes in the pattern of terrorism. The terrorism threat within the United States is increasing. In
1994, the State Department reported that attacks by state-sponsored, secular terrorist groups declined, but attacks increased from radical
fundamentalist groups, who operate more autonomously. The Federal Bureau of Investigation reported in 1994 that the most important development in international terrorism in the United States was the emergence of international radical terrorist groups with an infrastructure that can support terrorist activities. These groups are more difficult to infiltrate, and, consequently, it is also more difficult to predict and interdict their attacks.

Since 1991, the FAA has completed three studies to prioritize the specific methods that terrorists might adopt to attack aviation and to identify countermeasures. Although the studies are classified, the unclassified conclusion has been consistent: the greatest threat is explosives in all types of concealment. The FAA believes the
greatest vulnerability is concealment of explosives in checked baggage. About 450 million passengers board domestic flights each
year, and the volume of their checked bags is enormous. On domestic flights, controls over checked luggage are not as stringent as on
international flights. The FAA is funding the development of technology to screen checked bags, passengers, carry-on luggage, cargo, and mail.

A recent threat in Asia indicates the potential extent of terrorists' motivation and capabilities. Information was accidentally uncovered
in early January 1995 about plans for multiple attacks on specific U.S. flights in Asia. Existing extraordinary security procedures in place at international airports would not have countered the specific threat; consequently, the FAA further mandated additional security measures at specific locations overseas. Officials told us that they
rarely have the advantage of a detailed, verifiable plot to target U.S. airlines and that the terrorists were aware both of airport vulnerabilities and how existing security measures could be defeated.
Security was returned to December 1994 levels in most locations following the arrests of the plot leaders. The threat in Asia has caused the FAA to increase research and development funding for
certain types of screening.


TERRORISM COUNTERTHREAT
STRATEGY
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(See figure in printed
edition.)

The FAA's counterthreat strategy is to mandate security measures commensurate with, or tailored to, the level of threat at specific places and times. The threat overseas is higher than domestically.
On all international flights, the FAA requires U.S. carriers to implement the International Civil Aviation Organization standards as a minimum, including the inspection of carry-on passenger baggage and passenger bag match. Bag matching is a procedure to ensure that a passenger who checks a bag also boards the flight; if not, the bag is removed. The FAA also requires additional, more stringent measures--including passenger interviews and 100 percent checked
baggage screening and supplementary carry-on baggage screening measures--at all airports in Europe and the Middle East, and many
airports elsewhere. Further, the FAA requires, depending on the destination, various security controls for checked bags on all
international departures by U.S. and foreign carriers from the United States.

For flights within the United States, baseline security measures include the use of walk-through metal detectors for passengers and X-ray screening of carry-on luggage augmented by procedures from a written contingency plan developed by the FAA in coordination with
the aviation industry. The plan describes a wide range of procedures that can be invoked depending on the nature and degree of the threat.
Among these procedures are passenger bag match and passenger profiling. Profiling is a method of identifying potentially threatening passengers, who are then subjected to additional security
measures. Profiling reduces the number of passengers requiring additional security measures.

For domestic flights, the heightened security measures currently in effect are at their highest level since the Gulf War. They have included surveillance of airport operations, parking restrictions, and stricter control over baggage.

Senior FAA officials believe that some security measures that are now invoked only in higher threat conditions should be incorporated into
the everyday baseline security for domestic flights. However, these officials told us the costs and impacts of these measures would be
significant; for example, the FAA estimates that incorporating bag matching in everyday security measures could cost up to $2 billion. They said that standard cost-benefit analyses would likely reject these measures, and consequently, they believe a consensus is needed among industry, Congress, and the executive branch, before they
initiate rule-making procedures to require these measures. Further, they believe that without consensus the rule making would fail.

PLANNED EXPLOSIVES DETECTION
TECHNOLOGY DEPLOYMENT
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(See figure in printed
edition.)

In the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act, Congress directed the FAA to (1) accelerate explosives detection research and development,
which had been ongoing since 1977, and (2) certify explosive detection systems prior to mandating their deployment. Congress
further set November 1993 as a goal for deploying new security technology and procedures to counter terrorism. In implementing its certification responsibilities under the act, the FAA published
criteria for explosive detection technology in September 1993 after an extensive examination of the threat to aviation and after coordination with other federal agencies and the scientific and
academic communities. The criteria require that a system certified for use on checked baggage for international flights meet specific performance requirements, using testing protocols developed by the National Academy of Sciences, to automatically detect concealed explosives. The FAA believes that congressional direction to develop performance requirements and testing protocols in conjunction with the scientific community contributed to delaying the introduction of new technology.

Conventional X-ray devices, currently used domestically for international flights, have performance limitations and are dependent
on a human operator's ability to interpret images for potential threats. These X-rays performed poorly in a special assessment that
the FAA conducted in May 1994, with five U.S. carriers at four major domestic airports that were origination points for international flights. This assessment used moderately sophisticated, simulated explosive devices.

Subsequent to its special domestic assessment, the FAA certified one automated explosives detection system. The FAA does not plan to
mandate the use of this system until two or more competing systems have been certified and airport demonstrations have been successfully completed. Once that happens, the FAA plans a phased-in deployment because of manufacturers' constraints on large-scale production and
the difficulty of integrating explosives detection equipment and procedures into existing baggage handling systems. The FAA expects to mandate the deployment of certified explosives detection systems beginning no earlier than 1997. Some countries, such as the United Kingdom, Israel, and Belgium, are already deploying new advanced
automated technologies.

The cost to acquire new technology is uncertain but could be substantial. The FAA is developing a model to estimate the systemwide costs of a variety of checked baggage screening methods,
including deployment of certified technology at the busiest domestic airports. Preliminary FAA estimates are that one-time acquisition
and installation costs of the certified system for the 75 busiest airports could range from $400 million to $2.2 billion, with continuing annual operating costs of 10 percent or less. We have not
verified these estimates, which will be further refined through joint efforts between the FAA and the aviation industry. Final costs will depend upon several factors, including the extent to which passenger profiling is used. According to FAA officials, profiling reduces the number of bags screened by about 80 percent.